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T h e executives of the big private banks feel very sat-
isfied with their growing role in the financing of the 
less developed countries and furthermore consider 
that there is a general harmony of interests between 
borrowers and lenders: a sense of satisfaction which 
is shared by an appreciable number of economists 
and officials responsible for formulating policies 
both in the developed and the under-developed 
countries. 
While he does recognize that there are some 
positive aspects in the situation, this optimistic 
attitude is not shared by the author, who maintains 
that such a general harmony of interests does not 
exist. The view is based on four main characteristics 
of private bank loans which are usually in conflict 
with the interests of development; (i) these loans 
involve a narrow and conservative interpretation of 
the criteria for judging the creditworthiness of the 
borrower countries which does not usually take into 
consideration efforts to achieve broader economic 
and social objectives; (ii) they involve strict repay-
ment deadlines which can complicate the manage-
ment of the debt and, when the case arises, make it 
impossible to secure debt relief; (iii) there is a 
tendency for private banks to have brief periods of 
high liquidity which generate a harmful boom in 
supply-led loans; and (iv) the private financial 
market is not competitive and is less than neutral at 
certain crucial stages in the credit cycle of a country. 
After pointing out some serious deficiencies 
which are to be observed in the present situation, the 
author devotes the final section of his paper to 
exploring the alternatives and comes to the con-
clusion that the world economy should make a better 
use of the division of labour which has already been 
instituted in development financing by reviving the 
importance of loans from multilateral institutions 
and the private bond markets. 
•Economic Development Division, CEPAL. This 
study was presented by the author at the CEPAL Academic 
Seminar in November 1979, 
I 
Introduction* 
The emergence of private 
commercial banks as 
principal lenders to less 
developed countries 
The decade of the 1970s has been marked by 
the emergence of private commercial banks 
(herein used interchangeably with "bank" or 
"banks") as a major force in the transfer of 
resources to developing countries.1 In the two 
preceding decades the external finance of 
these countries had generally been dominated 
by official multilateral and bilateral institu-
tions, together with credit from suppliers and 
direct investments of foreign firms. Banks 
usually limited themselves to shorter-term 
finance often associated with trade. However, 
beginning in the early 1970s the interaction of 
many factors associated with the supply and 
demand for international finance generated 
conditions whereby banks rapidly expanded 
the volume of their lending to developing 
countries and there was a qualitative change in 
the relationship between bankers and the 
government authorities of less developed 
countries (LDCs).2 
As an illustration of the nature of the 
change in the role of banks, it can be pointed 
out that in 1970 they accounted for roughly 19% 
*The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful 
comments of H. Assael, D. Hoelscher, M. Mortimore, A. 
Pinto and L. Willmore on the first draft of the paper. It goes 
without saying that any errors in the work are the sole 
responsibility of the author. 
'Actually, this might be better termed the re-emer-
gence of banks, since prior to the great financial collapse of 
1929 these institutions had been significant lenders to 
Latin America and other developing regions. See Davis, 
pp. 6-21. 
2 By now there is some literature that covers —in 
varying degrees of comprehensiveness— the recent rise in 
bank lending to developing countries. See Beek, Devlin 
(first half of 1978), Gorostiaga, Kapur, Lissakers, Sargen, 
Wachtel, Watson, Weinert (1973 and 1978) and Wellons 
(1977). 
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of the total current account finance (including 
reserve accumulation) of the non-oil-exporting 
developing countries, most of which was of a 
short-term nature (maturities of less than one 
year). By 1974, however, banks generated 33% 
of this financé, with the bulk of the transactions 
falling into the medium and long-term category 
(maturities of 1-5 and greater than 5 years, 
respectively). With some increase in lending 
by official agencies in the post-oil-crisis period 
coupled with the moderation of current ac-
count deficits, the banks' participation has now 
slipped back somewhat to between 25% and 
30% of the total. Again medium and long-term 
transactions predominate.3 
As it has now become customary to point 
out, the structure of commercial bank lending 
is by no means symmetrical. In absolute tenns, 
most of the lending has gone to the upper-
income developing countries, especially those 
of Latin America. As may be seen in table 1, 
Latin America accounts for nearly two-thirds 
of the gross indebtedness of the non-oil-expor-
ting developing countries to commercial 
banks, and almost all of the net indebtedness. 
While the bulk of this debt is accounted for by 
Brazil and Mexico, other countries like Peru, 
Chile, Argentina and Colombia are also impor-
tant clients of international banks. 
The relative weight of banks in the struc-
ture of these countries' external finance has 
likewise become considerable. In 1966-1970 
the average net contribution of banks to the 
current account finance of Latin America was 
only slíghtíy greater than 12% of the total, but 
by 1974 banks accounted for more than two-
thirds of net flows, and in 1976, despite new 
lending by international organizations, the 
bank contribution was still nearly 50%.4 
Thus, the issue of bank lending to devel-
oping countries is largely associated with the 
upper-income group; lower-income LDCs 
have had only limited access to credit from 
banks and basically remain dependent on 
official concessionary finance. 
The much higher profile for commercial 
banks in external finance has brought many 
tangible benefits for both lenders and bor-
rowers: for example, for banks it has meant 
substantially increased earnings,5 and for the 
Table 1 
INDEBTEDNESS OF NON-OIL-EXPORTING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO PRIVATE 
COMMERCIAL BANKS AT END OF DECEMBER 1977a 


















Source: Derived from data in the Bank for International Settlements, Basle: Forty-Eighth Annual Report, 12 June 1978, pp. 94-95. 
"Includes short-term debt. 
Excludes Caribbean area and Panama. 
''Excludes Israel. Residual estimate. 
Excludes Hong Kong and Singapore. 
' 'Debt less deposits in the banks. 
3 T h e data just cited are from Watson, table 2, pp. 12-13. 
4 See Massad and Zahler, table 1, p . 4. 
5 See Watson, p . 37 and Lissakers, pp. 10-11. 
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countries a significant influx of resources for 
development.6 All is not well, however, as the 
dependence of developing country borrowers 
on commercial banks appears to have gone 
beyond prudent bounds. The focus of concern 
is not on the issue which has received most 
attention to date, i.e., the ability of borrowing 
countries to repay their debt and the ability of 
banks to absorb such risks. There is little 
question that in one way or another countries 
will continue to repay their obligations and 
accept the costs of doing so.7 Rather what is of 
concern here is the qualitative impact of bank 
lending on the process of development. 
The problem arises from the fact that the 
willingness of banks to lend extensively to 
developing countries has reduced pressures on 
the industrialized nations to support official 
institutions and has contributed to the long-
term stagnation of funding from this source.8 
Thus , banks have not merely increased the 
finance available to developing countries but 
have also effectively displaced official insti-
tutions as the major agent for the transfer of 
resources to the South. Moreover, the dis-
placement has not only been in terms of the 
volume of lending, but also in terms of 
The increased presence and power of inter-
national commercial banks in development 
{and world) finance has not gone unnoticed by 
these institutions. Through eloquent spokes-
men banks have entered directly into the 
debate about their role in developing country 
6 See Devlin (first half oí 1978), pp. 68-79. 
Economists and banks in Northern countries have 
gone to great lengths to prove empirically that developing 
countries are indeed capable of paying off their debts. See, 
forexample, Smith, Brittain, van B. Cleveland and Brittain, 
and Solomon. Also see Lewis, chapter 9, lor an interesting 
perspective on the debt problem. 
"Between 1965 and 1975 there was no real growth of 
officiai lending. See OKCD, p. 153. 
functions, as banks have gone beyond strictly 
commercial lending and entered into the usual 
domain of official institutions, i.e., balance-of-
payments support, infrastructural project 
lending, general programme lending, etc. 
This situation gives rise to a dilemma 
because commercial banks do not appear to be 
an appropriate primary agent of finance for 
developing countries. Private commercial 
banks, as their name implies, are not devel-
opment institutions and their private com-
mercial time and risk preferences make it 
difficult for them to provide finance in ways 
which satisfy the broad socioeconomic goals of 
development. When external finance becomes 
commercialized, as it is today, this asymmetry 
becomes dangerous, placing strains on the 
development process and perhaps even on the 
world banking system itself. Thus, analysis will 
suggest that officials in the North should be less 
complacent about the preponderant presence 
of banks in development finance and that the 
current situation requires a more courageous 
stance in the North that will foster appropriate 
funding of the current account balances of 
developing countries. 
finance, to which their attitude is usually very 
positive.9 Their arguments are generally f'o-
cussed according to their specific audiences. 
When addressing themselves to the pub-
lic in their own home countries the banks stress 
the over-exaggerated nature of the concern 
about their lending to developing countries, 
assuring their audiences that the bulk of the 
lending has been to creditworthy, semi-indus-
trialized economies; that most loans have been 
of a short to medium-term nature and/or have 
carried external guarantees of the industrial-
J See , for instance, Watson, Friedman, and van B. 
Cleveland and Brittain. 
II 
Lending to LDCs: The view of bankers 
72 CEPAL REVIEW N.° 9 / December 1979 
ized countries; that debt growth in the devel-
oping countries in real terms has been reason-
able and is serviceable; that the record for loan 
losses abroad has been considerably better 
than that at home; and that in any case the 
exposed assets represent a relatively small 
percentage of the total loan porfolio. 
When addressing officials in developing 
countries, banks emphasize that their presence 
has greatly increased the resources available 
for development; that their involvement in the 
recycling of oil surpluses has helped to avoid a 
drastic adjustment process; that unlike official 
institutions; loans from banks are quickly 
arranged and disbursed, are not tied to the 
purchase of any suppliers' goods and are of a 
non-political nature, based on the merits of 
each case; and that due to a competitive 
environment, borrowers enjoy the freedom to 
"shop around" for credits, thereby obtaining 
the best available terms. Finally, while banks 
admit that they are basically limited to short 
and medium-term finance, they add that they 
are interested in long-term relationship with 
creditworthy customers, so that in effect, 
through the continuous rollover of shorter-term 
credits, these funds can "perform a function 
similar to long-term funds".10 
T h e same spokesmen see the increased 
participation of banks in development finance 
as be ing "demand driven", with banks re-
sponding on the basis of "normal" credit 
criteria.11 Furthermore, its is claimed that 
—because of the benefits noted previously— 
"developing countries want private banks to 
play a significant role in their development 
process...".12 Indeed, the perceived harmony of 
interest has been expressed on one occasion in 
the following way: 
"The benefits of becoming—and remaining— 
creditworthy in the private bank markets are 
now seen in most developing countries to be of 
major proportions. In these countries, it is seen 
that policies needed to maintain external 
creditworthiness with banks are also needed to 
meet national development objectives. It is the 
maintenance of the country's economic devel-
1 0 F r i e d m a n , p , 3 9 . 
u S e e Friedman, p. 48 and Watson, p. 27. 
l 2 S e e Friedman, p . 61. 
opment that is the prime purpose of policy 
measures, but if it also accomplishes availabili-
ty of private credits, the process of devel-
opment is greatly facilitated."'3 
But just what is creditworthiness ? While it 
is seen to vary among banks, there are some 
common elements which are worth examining. 
The concept of creditworthiness puts a 
premium on the availability of foreign ex-
change to service the debt; when an economy is 
run in such a way as to ensure availability this is 
termed "good management".14 
Logically, then, when bankers are scruti-
nizing a country's creditworthiness, great 
emphasis is placed on external liquidity indi-
cators such as the various components of the 
balance of payments, debt service, the level of 
foreign exchange reserves, inflation, domestic 
credit and exchange rate policy, etc.15 External 
debt management also is important, as is 
industrial growth and a country's treatment of 
foreign investment.16 
As a tacit recognition of the still immature 
state of the art,17 most spokesmen stress the on-
going need to improve techniques of credit-
worthiness analysis. As part of this process, 
many banks, especially the larger ones, have 
been raiding the ranks of development insti-
tutions in an effort to recruit more personnel 
with relevant experience in country and devel-
opment economic analysis. 
As well as recognizing the need for more 
effective evaluation óf creditworthiness, 
bankers have also become concerned once 
again about conditionality. In the 1950s and 
1960s banks had been cautious, limited and 
conditional lenders to developing countries, 
with conditionality itself often linked to IMF 
standby agreements. But in the exceptionally 
competitive environment of the early 1970s, 
funds were lent to developing country govern-
ments with few, if any, reservations; project 
l3lbid., p . 66. 
^ S e e Friedman, pp. 24-29; Watson, pp. 42 and 45. 
1 5This is clear from a review of the criteria of banks. 
See Goodman, Asian Finance, BOA Methodology, Bra-
ckenridge, Anderson, and Wolfe. Also see Friedman, pp. 
24-30 and Watson, p . 42. 
1 6Friedman, pp. 47 and 53. 
1 7The relatively primitive state of the art is clear from 
the Goodman survey and research presented by Blask. 
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loans often received little or no scrutiny, and 
large amounts of freely disposable funds were 
contracted by LDCs, all seemingly on the 
security of borrower government guaran-
tees.18,19 However, the massive accumulation of 
bank debt by the developing countries in 1974-
1975, coupled with the fragile external position 
of many of these countries, helped to bring 
back a trend towards conditional lending. Also 
important in the return to a more traditional 
conservative posture was the bankers' concern 
about the very viability of the international 
banking system itself.20 
At first —seeing that the volume of then-
loans dwarfed lending by official agencies— 
the banks felt confident enough about their 
leverage to entertain ideas of extending condi-
tional balance-of-payments assistance on their 
own.21 The most celebrated test case was Peru, 
where in mid-1976 a large group of internation-
al banks agreed to support a stabilization pro-
gramme in which an umbrella IMF standby 
credit was conspicuous by its absence.22 
1 8 This is starkly clear from the author's study (available 
late 1979) ot the evolution oí commercial bank lending to 
the government of Peru over the period 1965-1976. In the 
latter half oí the 1960s, loans were heavily secured and/or 
conditioned by policy limitations, especially with regard to 
contracting new debt. Furthermore, loans were often 
l inked to an I M F standby credit, However, by the early 
1970s credits were essentially devoid of any conditional ity 
and many were oí free disposal, i.e., with no ex ante 
purpose stated in the loan agreement. Maturities and 
interest spreads (margins on top of floating bank interest 
rate) were also considerably more favourable. As Weinert 
(1973, p . 37) has pointed out, there is no way this 
transformation in lending behaviour could have been 
justified by changes in the economic circumstances of 
Peru. For information on the scope and goals of the 
Peruvian project see Devlin (February 1978). 
1 9 The expansive (some have even said reckless) atti-
tude oí this rather unique period of world banking is well 
summarized by Cummings. Also see Wellons (1977), p. 24. 
2 0 Dur ing tlie first half of the 1970s many banks 
overextended themselves both on loans and foreign ex-
change transactions. This was manifested in the failure of 
Bankhaus I .D. Herstatt on 26 June 1974, followed by 
Franklin National Bank later in the year. Both banks went 
bankrupt due to bad management oí foreign exchange 
transactions. 
2 1 See, for instance, Morgan Guaranty Trust Company 
(May 1976), pp. 8-9. 
2 2 See Belliveau. It should be pointed out that the 
Peruvian representatives asked the banks to participate in a 
stabilization programme because political considerations 
made the Government unwilling to undergo IMF scrutiny, 
(see, in Belliveau, the interview with the then Central 
Bank President Carlos Santistevan). In 1976 the banks also 
The Peruvian loan agreement generated a 
heated political debate about the advisability 
of international banks entering directly into the 
economic policy of developing countries. In 
response to this criticism, the banks once again 
withdrew to more familiar terrain by making 
their loans to "problem" countries conditioned 
upon an IMF standby agreement. While 
bankers are quick to point out that the Fund's 
conditions are not necessarily sufficient for 
private banks' creditworthiness criteria,23 in 
practice standby agreements have come to 
serve as the "green light" for bank lending, 
thus conveniently passing the political em-
barrassments generally associated with "ad-
jus tment" onto the international organization. 
Since the Peru affair of 1976, a clear 
strategy has been evolving for dealing with 
countries that have debt service problems. As 
just mentioned, first and foremost is the con-
dition that a country must call in the IMF for a 
standby agreement. Until such an agreement is 
arranged, the banks will refuse to grant any 
new credit, other than perhaps very brief 
rollovers (often with maturities of only several 
months). Moreover, the rollovers are often 
granted only at the last minute and just prior to 
payment deadlines in order both to place 
pressure on government authorities to submit 
to the I M F conditions and to prevent outright 
default, which banks in any case want to avoid 
because of the adverse effect this might have on 
their annual financial statements.24 
In situations where borrowing govern-
ments seek some form of debt relief, banks 
have a rather special view of their role in such 
operations. Official lenders —through the ad 
hoc Paris Club mechanism— will generally 
(although sometimes reluctantly) reschedule 
debts over a medium to long-term period. 
Banks, however, see things differently: a fun-
damental distinction is made between debts to 
official creditors and private creditors, and it is 
lent to Argentina on the basis of an economic programme. 
Information about this less publicized case appears in 
Biem. p. 724. 
2 3 See Friedman, p. 53. 
^ S e e the February, March, May and June 1978 issues 
of The Andean Report for a good description of how the 
banks used short rollover credits as a way to pressure the 
Peruvian Government into an agreement with the IMF. 
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held that private debts must receive the highest 
priority and be serviced as originally sched-
uled.25 Thus, debt relief from banks is to be 
avoided because ' 'rescheduling of debt due to 
private banks will seriously damage a country's 
creditworthiness with private lenders, and will 
therefore impair future access to needed pri-
vate capital".2" 
This attitude is reflected in private banks' 
dealings with developing countries. When 
Zaire requested a 10-year rescheduling of the 
principal of private bank debts in 1976 —an 
agreement which would have paralleled that 
granted by creditors of the Paris Club— the 
banks resisted. Instead they proposed to "res-
tore Zaire's creditworthiness" by having the 
country clear up its accumulated arrears, after 
which, upon fulfilment of some other condi-
tions, a new loan would be extended to re-
finance upcoming payments to the banks.27 
In another case, when Peru sought debt 
relief in 1978, banks again chose an indepen-
dent route. The Paris Club creditors agreed to 
reschedule 90% of the 1979-1980 payments 
over a 7-year period; the banks, on the other 
hand, granted a rollover credit for 1979 
payments of principal and then agreed to 
convert it to a 7-year balance-of-payments loan 
Bankers are certainly not alone in the sanguine 
view they take about their role in development 
finance: a majority of policy-makers and econo-
mists in the industrialized countries and a 
significant number in the developing world 
seem to share their enthusiasm about lending 
to LDCs. Such criticism as there was in 1975-
1976 —coming mostly from the Centre and 
concerning the risks of LDC default— has 
waned considerably in more recent years, 
permitt ing bankers to entertain strategies for 
^ S e e Friedman, p. 69. 
™lbid. 
2 7 See Biem, p. 727 and Friedman, p. 71. As oí' May 
1979, the new loan had still not been organized. 
in 1980. Principal payments due in 1980 are to 
be rolled over until 1981 and then converted 
into a 6-year loan.28 Maintenance of an IMF 
standby accord was a condition for the 
rescheduling by the banks and the Paris Club. 
Notwithstanding difficulties with "prob-
lem" countries like Jamaica, Nicaragua, Peru, 
Zaire, etc., banks are generally eager to 
continue their role in the external finance of 
developing countries, although they would not 
mind seeing greater funding from internation-
al institutions so as to move towards "at least a 
partial restoration of the traditional balance 
between official and private financial flows".29 
They feel that this in turn would help to 
enhance the creditworthiness of borrowers 
and allow banks to maintain the volume of 
loans to developing countries. In addition, 
some bankers have suggested that there should 
be a greater flow of country information to 
banks from international institutions such as 
the IMF;30 as indicated earlier, however, most 
bankers have shied away from the idea of 
formal co-operation with such institutions on 
the grounds that banks must maintain their 
freedom to make independent judgements 
about the creditworthiness of a borrower. 
the global manipulation of resources for devel-
opment. 
There is little doubt that many of the vir-
tues that bankers extol concerning their new 
role in the external finance of developing coun-
tries make good sense and few reasonable peo-
2 8 The refinancing operation covers 90% oí the sched-
uled repayment. The interest rate on the first credit is 
1.875% over the London Interbank Offer Rate; interest on 
the second credit is still under negotiation. Source; 
unpublished data secured from the editor of The Andean 
Report. Also see Banco Central de Reserva del Perú, pp. 48-
49. 
Watson, p . 8. Also see Brackenridge (p. 53), Anderson 
(p. 44) and Friedman (p. 81). 
3( iSee Watson (p. 70) and Brackenridge (p. 53). 
I l l 
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pie would want to disagree with them. For in-
stance, banks clearly are efficient intermedi-
aries of financial resources, there being no 
better testimony to this than the way in which 
they skillfully managed the recycling of the 
O P E C surplus. Banks have also proved to be 
highly flexible lenders whose interest rates are 
indeed reasonable in real tenus. Nevertheless, 
the picture that they paint about an over-
whelming harmony of interests is an exces-
sively optimistic one which hides some serious 
déficiences in the current nature of finance for 
developing countries. 
Rather than noting a general harmony of 
interests, from another angle one can see a 
number of important asymmetries between 
what is good for the banks and what is good for 
development, using the latter term in its most 
far-reaching sense. The impact of these on the 
developing world was minimized in the 1950s 
and 1960s by the fact that banks were simply 
not in the front line of development finance. 
However, with their emergence as important 
lenders to the Third World —and principal 
lenders to the upper-income developing 
countries— the contradictions have become 
more apparent and, of course, more threatening 
to the process of development. The following 
paragraphs will bring out some of these 
problems. 
A. Banks: a conservative influence 
on the development policy 
There are several factors which seriously 
restrict the time and risk preferences of banks. 
First, they are profit-oriented institutions 
which operate on the basis of private rates of 
return. They can internalize social rates of 
return on their lending only to the extent that 
these enhance the former, but, the gestation 
period for any such feedback process can be 
very long. 
Second, a great deal of bankers' resources 
come from call or short-term time deposits. The 
short-term deposit base places a limit on the 
degree to which banks can prudently mismatch 
maturities, i.e., lend long on short funds. Thus, 
the nature of the resource base gives tírese 
institutions only a short and at most a medium-
term time horizon with regard to lending. 
Third, as bankers will readily admit, they 
have a special concern for minimizing risk and 
avoiding losses. This orientation is partly a 
matter of tradition, but it also reflects the reality 
that banks operate with other people's money 
and must ensure the safety of deposits if access 
to resources is to be maintained. This leads to a 
conservative view of life where "caution and 
prudence" are the watchwords for interna-
tional lending operations.31 When viewing 
prospective loans to developing countries, 
bankers are naturally primarily interested in 
the prospects for repayment. It is not sur-
prising, then, that liquidity indicators domi-
nate creditworthiness criteria; good manage-
ment is synonymous with insurance of liquidi-
ty to service debts, even if this means deflation 
of the local economy to free foreign exchange. 
Thus bankers are by nature conservative 
businessmen. This was of little importance 
when their role in channelling resources to 
developing countries was secondary or tertiary, 
as their power to influence events was limited, 
but today they dominate finance and their 
opinions and actions can have a considerable 
impact on the development process. 
When viewed from a global perspective, it 
becomes clear that bankers' individual time 
and risk preferences —which may be perfectly 
rational from the standpoint of an individual 
institution— may distort the allocation of world 
resources to developing countries. This has 
been well expressed by Albert Fishlow, who 
rightly points out that private credit decisions 
will not necessarily lead to an appropriate level 
and distribution of international purchasing 
power: 
"Capital markets do not settle by themselves at 
a unique interest rate that determines the 
distributions of all the surplus to the most 
productive users. Instead private loans go to 
selected and favoured borrowers. Perversely, 
lack of need facilitates access to capital. It is 
easier to borrow for reserve acquisition than for 
imports, easier to borrow when there is surplus 
foreign exchange rather than a shortage."32 
31 See Friedman, p. 79, and Greene, p. 199. For a brief 
period in the early 1970s there was a breakdown in this 
cautions tradition of international banking. 
3 2Fishlow, p. 137. Guido Carli, a former President of 
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Moreover, bankers can not only generate a 
less than satisfactory global distribution of 
resources but can also contribute to a skewed 
distribution at the level of an individual devel-
oping country. Of course, bankers are not 
responsible for the allocation of the resources 
of a country: this task is undertaken by Third 
World policy-makers. But they can never-
theless seriously affect the decisions of such 
policy-makers, in several ways. 
First, in a situation where commercial 
banks dominate external finance there is only 
l imited access to other types of funding. Thus, 
the cost and shorter maturities of bank finance 
become a relative constraint on the possibili-
ties for the prudent utilization of external 
resources in the local economy. 
Second, when bankers are the primary 
lenders to an LDC government, they have 
considerable leverage and can exert pressure 
—either directly or indirectly— on policy-
making. T h e situation is analogous to the 
impact that a bank can have on a heavily 
indebted corporation, for through their finan-
cial leverage bankers can steer policy in the 
direction of conservative financial manage-
ment at the expense of bolder objectives P Bold 
objectives for a corporation are profit maxi-
mization and expansion; in the case of a 
developing country the corresponding aim is 
the rapid maximization of development po-
tential in the context of the enhancement of the 
material (and spiritual) well-being of the 
general population. 
I t should be emphasized that develop-
ment, by its very nature, must be a very bold 
process. Often policy-makers must be ambi-
tious and assume large future risks in order to 
avoid stagnation, human suffering and social 
disruption today. This is particularly true in a 
democratic developing country where compe-
ting demands on limited resources can be more 
easily and effectively expressed, thereby 
forcing authorities to seek "consensual" rather 
than "opt imal" economic programmes.34 How-
Italy's Central Bank, has expressed a similar concern. See 
Carli , pp . 20-21. 
^ S e e Kotz, p . 142. Also see Hayes, pp. 117-118. 
•^In an authoritarian regime, the demands of the 
masses may not find effective expression at all. 
ever, a country that is heavily reliant on 
commercial bank finance will undoubtedly 
feel pressure in favour of a conservative policy 
that places priority on a strong balance-of-
payments performance and reserve accumu-
lation, often at the sacrifice of broader-based 
development objectives. This is so because 
programmes oriented towards the satisfaction 
of basic needs and income distribution 
—which are undoubtedly key ingredients in 
real development —usually weigh heavily on 
the balance of payments and reserves.35 
Bankers are unlikely to be impressed by re-
duced unemployment, improvements in health 
care and social well being if these are gained at 
the expense of a country's external liquidity 
position. Thus, Third World financial manag-
ers who are preoccupied by their countries' 
creditworthiness may be tempted to place 
basic needs and balanced income distribution 
at the margin of public policy. It is not sur-
prising that many of the banks' favourite devel-
oping countries are considered by many ob-
servers to be highly authoritarian régimes 
whose socioeconomic policy is not character-
ized by a primordial concern for social justice 
and economic and political participation.36 
It should also be noted that bank finance is 
exceptionally well placed to exert pressures 
because of the rather short maturity structure of 
the loans. The asymmetry between the long-
term requirements of development and the 
short-term nature of bank finance means that 
bankers are continuously being asked to roll-
over their credits, which is a terribly awkward 
way to accomodate the gestation period of 
development programmes. Not only are 
countries repeatedly exposed to the volatile 
nature of the terms offered on international 
financial markets, but they must also regularly 
pass under the cautious eye of their bankers, 
whose confidence must be maintained if roll-
overs (and / or transfers) are to be achieved. 
•^While in theory a reform / basic needs approach to 
development is not necessarily inconsistent with a healthy 
balance of payments, the state of the art of public policy 
making in developing countries is unfortunately such that 
in practice one has tended to prevail over the other. 
^Banke r s do not necessarily prefer authoritarianism, it 
is just that this type of régime can more easily ensure 
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B.The primacy of repayment schedules 
Another example of the less than complete 
harmony of interests between banks and devel-
oping countries is the rigid way in which 
bankers view repayment schedules. 
Bankers tend to take a dim view of the 
strategy of renegotiating terms on old loans by 
contracting new refinance credits that take 
advantage of favourable changes in conditions 
on international capital markets. As expressed 
by one spokesman: "It goes without saying that 
refinancing is undertaken by most banks... only 
very reluctantly and only for customers with 
whom... (they) have excellent long-term rela-
tionships".37 
To discourage prepayment strategies 
—liquidating in full outstanding old loans with 
receipts from cheaper new loans— banks often 
provide for quite sizeable penalty fees for 
prepayment in their contracts. In the case of 
Peru, for example, over 60% of all medium-
term commercial bank credit to the public 
sector during 1971-1976 carried a prepayment 
penalty, typically ranging between 2 1/2 and 
1/2% of the amount prepaid, depending on the 
contractual year in which prepayment was 
effected.38 Another tactic involves "moral 
suasion", by which it is made perfectiy clear to 
the borrower that any attempt to refinance or 
prepay would create great displeasure at the 
bank.39 This latter strategy can be quite ef-
fective the larger the bank involved and the 
greater the country's reliance on commercial 
credit. Finally, in some instances banks have 
even been known to include clauses in their 
contracts which actually forbid prepayment, 
although few sophisticated borrowers are like-
ly to fall victims to this tactic. 
Some countries are more successful than 
others in circumventing bankers' reluctance to 
refinance, with the incidence of success in-
creasing the higher the liquidity in the market 
conditions that provide favourable prospects for repayment 
oí loans. 
3 7 See Benney, p . 57. 
3 B The figures are from field research of the author. See 
the project cited in footnote 18. 
^ B r a z i l , which in 1978 was greatly interested in 
r idding itself of some costly loans, has been a victim of this 
strategy. See Evans. 
and the more attractive the customer.40 How-
ever, it is distressing that such obstacles 
prevail, because prepayment and refinance 
strategies are important tools to developing 
countries which permit them to assuage some 
of the impact of the surges in interest charges 
and contractions of maturities that can occur on 
private credit markets. 
This is not to imply that prepayment or 
refinancing is a "right" of the borrower. Such 
strategies are undoubtedly troublesome to a 
bank: not only does it lose a profitable loan, but 
it also receives unwanted liquidity, unless it 
participates itself in the new credit. Moreover, 
a bank cannot call for ex post adjustment of 
terms on an old loan when market conditions 
shift in its favour. Nevertheless, what appears 
to be rational behaviour on the part of an 
individual bank, could be detrimental to all 
concerned from a broader perspective, because 
a developing country borrower that can trade in 
old loans for more favourable terms is a better 
overall credit risk and generally has increased 
capacity to assume new debt. 
Bankers are even reluctant to depart from 
repayment schedules at times when countries 
are experiencing serious debt problems (as 
opposed to mere short-term liquidity prob-
lems). As shown earlier, banks reject any move 
to reschedule older loans, opting instead for 
new loans that are heavily conditioned, carry 
short maturities and are loaded down by high 
interest charges and heavy fees. For instance, 
the US$ 400 million of refinance credits 
granted to a financially hard-pressed Peru in 
1976 were for 5 years (2 years' grace) at a spread 
of 2.25% over the London Interbank Offer Rate 
(LIBOR) and with accumulated flat fees of 
more than 1.5%.41 And when Peru sought a 
general rescheduling of its debt in 1978, banks 
instead responded with an offer for new re-
finance credits. As already noted, the 7-year 
maturity on the new loans matches the terms of 
the Paris Club accord; however, it is preceded 
See Euromoney. 
4 1A spread is a margin of points added to a floating base 
interest rate, usually the London Interbank Offer Rate, Flat 
Fees are a one-time percentage charge on the face value of a 
loan. The figures are from field research of the author. See 
the project cited in footnote 18. 
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by two years of "short leash" rollovers, which is 
a convenient way to maintain leverage over 
government policy during the difficult 1979-
1980 period. 
From the viewpoint of an individual bank 
it is no doubt sound business to extend new 
loans with high spreads and short maturities to 
countries with debt problems: a premium 
commensurate with perceived higher risks 
ensures profitability, shorter maturities mini-
mize risk and increase leverage, and a new loan 
ensures that "problem" credits do not appear 
on annual financial statements. However, from 
the standpoint of development, a debt crisis 
merits long-term rescheduling — longer even 
than the Paris Club is accustomed to offering— 
on moderate terms so that payments can be 
really smoothed out instead of just being 
postponed one or two years, after which they 
can soar u p again quickly to cause renewed 
damage.42 Also, rescheduling should be view-
ed as a convenient and desirable way of 
rescuing developing countries, instead of 
carrying the pejorative connotations it does 
today. 
C. The intermittently very active supply curve 
As mentioned earlier, bankers generally see 
their increased role in development finance as 
be ing "demand driven", i.e., a result of their 
having responded to the "demands" of devel-
oping countries. This is a clever ploy because 
bankers who advocate this position can elude 
responsibility for any ensuing problems that 
might develop with regard to repayment. One 
can imagine the response to a request for debt 
relief as being something along the lines of the 
following: "it was you who sought the credit 
and it is not our fault that you are now having 
difficulty in repaying it". 
But bankers are often more deeply in-
volved in the repayment problems of devel-
oping countries than they would lead many to 
bel ieve. To some degree the current burden of 
payments of developing countries reflects the 
effect of the uniquely permissive lending en-
vironment of 1972-1974, followed by radical 
re t renchment in 1975-1976. 
4 2 See Corea, pp. 72-73. 
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The period 1972-1974 was a time of high 
liquidity when banks were aggressively com-
peting for new customers in the developing 
world. Actually, developing countries were 
caught up in the tail end of an accumulating 
wave of expansion of international banking that 
began in the late 1950s, led by large US banks, 
and was followed in the 1960s by the Euro-
peans and in the 1970s by the US regional 
banks and the Japanese banks.43 In the early 
1970s the possibilities for continued rapid 
growth of lending to the industrialized coun-
tries were becoming exhausted, aggravated by 
a recession in the Centre in 1970-1971. In an 
environment of high liquidity and severe 
competitive pressure for growth of assets, 
lending consequently spilled over into the 
developing world, but even so the race for 
volume and marginal earnings greatly intensi-
fied, causing interest margins to decline dras-
tically and maturities to reach unprecedent-
ed lengths. Developing countries, naturally 
enough, were eager to take advantage of these 
unusual conditions. When the OPEC oil sur-
plus started flowing to the banks in late 1973, 
these institutions were even more eager 
to lend, while deficit-burdened countries 
were, of course, ready borrowers, especially as 
conditions were very favourable, with margins 
that had fallen below 1% and maturities that 
could easily range up to between 10 and 15 
years. 
Expansion of lending to LDCs continued 
at a very heated pace until mid-1974, when a 
series of important bank failures —derived 
from poor management of foreign exchange 
trading— marked an end to this euphoric 
period of lending. Nervous bankers quickly 
reappraised their international strategies and 
became much more selective lenders. More-
over, terms became very onerous, as margins 
for developing countries rose to 2% or more and 
maturities shrank to the point where a tenn of 
over 6 years was uncommon and loans for more 
than 10 years simply became impossible to 
obtain.44 This severe contraction of terms on 
4 3 For a good analysis of'how and why US banks were in 
the vanguard of the "internationalization" of world bank-
ing, see Robinson, and also Lissakurs, 
4 4 See Devlin (first half 1978), pp. 77-79. 
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lending contributed to a bunching of maturities 
and consequent debt service problems in 
recent years. Bankers maintained their highly 
restrictive terms on LDCs up to 1978, when 
margins again began to decline and maturities 
to widen as the bankers' resolve for prudent 
pricing oí loans was eroded by the pressures of 
continued liquidity.45 
The point to be made here is that the first 
half of the 1970s was a high-pressure period in 
the history of world banking and a time in 
which the supply side sometimes led events. 
T h e general environment of the times has been 
characterized by some financial men them-
selves as being one of ' 'supercharged credit 
expansion"; a "glad-handed, name-your-price 
approach" to credit extension.46 And the result 
was that some countries were literally deluged 
with offers of credit.47 
Even more important to this analysis is the 
fact that during the expansive phase bankers 
often paid little attention to the end-use of the 
credit, i.e., it made little difference whether 
credit was for military hardware, commercial 
aircraft or steel mills. Indeed, many banks did 
not have the infrastructure to evaluate credits 
and thus usually relied on the security of a 
sovereign government guarantee, itself evalu-
ated to a large extent by "feel", other subjec-
tive criteria, and even rumours.48 Standards 
continued to be lax during the early stages of 
the petrodollar recycling process, as banks 
tapped resources at relatively low interest costs 
and reloaned them at high interest rates and 
high placement fees.49 In this type of environ-
ment only relatively sophisticated borrowers 
could resist bankers' overtures: for those which 
4 5 A major factor behind the liberalization of borrowing 
conditions was the behaviour oí the Japanese banks. 
Unnerved by the uncertain events of mid-1974, they 
participated in a mass withdrawal from the market place, 
helping to tighten the borrowing environment. However, 
by 1978 Japan's accumulating balance-of-payments sur-
pluses fostered a re-emergence of these banks. They 
returned with a vengeance, and their aggressive approach 
to bidding for new business helped to drive interest rate 
margins down to levels that many bankers thought to be 
imprudent. 
4(1 From an interview with bankers quoted in Hayes, p. 
49. 
4 7 See Devlin (first half 1978), pp. 77-78 and p. 94. 
, l f i8ee Weinert (1973), p . 35. Also see Wellons (1977), p . 
24. 
4 9 S e e H a y e s , p . 2 9 7 . 
couldn't , like Zaire, Peru and Jamaica, the 
consequences are well known. 
Thus it seems that bankers are not com-
pletely innocent with regard to the current debt 
problems of developing countries: indeed, 
they appear to be at least partly to blame for 
present circumstances and it would seem justi-
fied to expect them to take a lenient attitude on 
any future rescue operations. It must also be 
remembered that commercial banks' profits on 
international operations were phenomenal in 
the early 1970s, due in no small part to the 
profitability of business with LDCs.50 Indeed, 
in view of the fact that risk premiums have been 
charged on LDC loans, might there not even be 
room in some cases to absorb moderate losses 
on future rescue missions? 
D. Commercial banks are not always 
competitive and neutral 
International banking is often seen as being a 
highly competitive operation where institu-
tions vigorously seek business on non-political 
terms. Carlos Diaz-Alejandro has gone even 
further and has described the Eurocurrency 
market as "standoffish and remote", so that it 
provides LDCs with greater opportunities for 
"national self-determination"51 than is avail-
able from the sometimes politically influenced 
lending of official agencies. 
The above view appears to be true of one 
point in the credit cycle, but not so much of 
others. 
It is clear that bankers are most attracted to 
"virgins",52 that is, countries not excessively 
burdened by external debt, not heavily repre-
sented in the portfolio of an individual bank, 
and perceived at the same time to be credit-
worthy. At this initial stage in a country's credit 
cycle —a position many developing countries 
enjoyed in the early 1970s— banks may very 
well compete vigorously to attract potential 
business, thus giving the country excellent 
opportunities for bargaining on the amount, 
costs and terms of credit. Moreover, at this 
5 0 See Lissakers, pp. 10-11. 
5 1 See Díaz-Alejandro, pp. 188-197. 
' This term came to my attention in a conversation 
with Arturo Porzecanski. 
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stage bankers are unlikely to be concerned 
about the use of a loan. The actual degree of 
competition experienced will depend on many 
other factors such as the liquidity of banks, the 
number of institutions operating in the inter-
national market, the general business psychol-
ogy of the time and the quality of the credit-
worthiness of the borrower. In the case of the 
latter factor —in view of the way credit-
worthiness is viewed by banks— the will-
ingness of these institutions to extend credit 
will probably be inversely related to the coun-
try's need for credit. 
All things being equal, the more com-
mercial credit paper that banks accumulated on 
a given country, the more their exposure 
becomes a consideration and the more their 
eagerness to compete for new business may 
wane. The bargaining position of the borrower 
is correspondingly eroded, and bankers even 
may become concerned about the use of 
credit.53 The degree of erosion, for its part, 
depends on other variables. If many new banks 
are entering the international market, this may 
compensate for the waning interest of other 
institutions. If liquidity surges and no new 
attractive customers appear, bankers may have 
no choice but to compete for existing cus-
tomers. If a country's creditworthiness some-
how improves, bankers may then be willing to 
absorb more exposure, thereby favourably af-
fecting the competitiveness equation.54 
If a country that has borrowed from banks 
loses its creditworthiness there is simply no 
competition at all: indeed, there may be a 
quasi-monopolistic situation that absolutely 
limits access to credit and encourages the 
market to intervene in the domestic affairs of 
the borrower. While no one could reasonably 
expect banks to compete for an uncreditworthy 
5 3 Unti l liquidity considerations led to the swamping of 
the market in mid-1978, Brazil may have faced a less 
competit ive environment as a result of its paper having 
flooded secondary markets. In 1977-1978, when some 
developing countries were experiencing declining mar-
gins on their loans on account of increasing liquidity in 
banking circles, Brazil was still paying rates closer to those 
which had prevailed in the stiff environment of 1975-1976. 
^Regula tory authorities of some countries place coun-
try lending limits on banks. If banks run up against this 
barrier exposure may become an absolute constraint on 
competition for some banks. 
country, this type of situation is an important 
consideration that is often overlooked by those 
who are awed by the competitive environment 
of Eurocurrency lending. It must be remem-
bered that developing countries, facing as they 
do volatile external markets and/or sensitive 
domestic socio-political and economic condi-
tions, are especially prone to the external 
balance-of-payments crises that can cause them 
to fall out of grace with banks. 
When a country exhibits serious external 
problems and faltering liquidity, banks will 
cease to compete to lend it money and its access 
to new commercial credit is effectively cut off. 
It is now a "problem" country and bankers 
actually collude in search of ways to insure that 
they will not individually and collectively 
incur losses. 
A good example again is Peru. In 1976, 
when Peru was seeking a large balance-of-
payments loan (really a refinance credit) to bail 
out its external accounts, its major private 
creditors formed a Steering Committee to 
negotiate with the government. Such a commit-
tee is undoubtedly an efficient way to organize 
negotiations, for without central co-ordination 
chaos could prevail. Nevertheless, this does 
not alter the fact that public officials faced 
an uncompetitive environment, as the banks 
that composed the Steering Committee negoti-
ated in a block and represented most of the 
more than 100 banks which had lent to the gov-
ernment. All banks demanded identical condi-
tions on the refinance credits, and Peru could 
not realistically turn elsewhere for credit, since 
the block represented nearly all the major 
international lenders. The collusive nature of 
the negotiations is confirmed by the fact that 
the syndicates formed were not of an inter-
national character; regional groups of banks 
—Americans, Canadians, Europeans, Japa-
nese^— banded together to enforce individual 
credit agreements which all displayed the 
same lending terms and verbatim formulation 
of many of the convenants.55 Later, in 1978, 
when Peru sought to reschedule its commercial 
debts , the banks formed another Steering 
Committee. 
5 5Research of the author. See project cited in footnote 
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Of course, in its negotiations with the 
banks Peru was not completely without a 
bargaining position, for it could always default: 
something the banks would surely want to 
avoid. Indeed, some have even seen the threat 
of default as a way in which banks can become 
"hostages" to the demands of developing 
countries.56 
A borrowing country's leverage should not 
be exaggerated, however. In the first place, a 
country cannot default selectively —thereby 
perhaps generating a more competitive envi-
ronment— because of the cross-default clauses 
which figure in almost all commercial bank 
loan contracts.57 Moreover, defaulting on all 
commercial banks is not a realistic option for a 
government wishing to remain a member of the 
Western capitalist community, since it would 
result in the cutting off of virtually all external 
commercial credit; it would cause the govern-
ment to face the wrath of its national business 
sector, which would undoubtedly have its 
access to credit adversely affected; and it could 
very well bring retaliation from the home 
governments of the banks. Moreover, the risks 
associated with default are by no means sym-
metrical, for while banks could probably 
absorb a prolonged default by any one borror-
wer, a country would find it much more 
difficult to absorb the effects of a blockade by 
its commercial creditors.58 Only if several coun-
tries joined together in default would there be 
serious possibilities for taking banks hostage, 
but even then, unless one of the countries were 
a super borrower such as Brazil or Mexico, the 
outcome would more than likely be merely a 
stalemate.59 
When a country is at the bottom end of 
a credit cycle, banks can also be very inter-
ventionist. Peru is a case in point. In 1976, 
when the government sought its balance-of-
payments loan the banks reluctantly agreed. 
^ S e e Lissakers, p . 58. 
57Cross-default clauses are not what one would expect 
from a "standoffish and remote" market. 
5 8 A study by the US Federal Reserve Bank shows that 
in the case of the six largest US banks only two borrowing 
countries each account for as much as 1.5% of total assets. 
Other borrowers account for much smaller proportions. See 
Watson, p . 50. 
59/¿?¿í¿. 
However, bankers insisted on a two-tranche 
credit with the second tranche being condi-
tional upon a favourable evaluation of the 
progress of the government's stabilization 
programme.60 Another more blatant form of 
intervention ism was a condition that the 
government must settle a tax dispute with one 
foreign firm and compensate another which 
had been nationalized a year earlier: not sur-
prisingly, both corporations had close links 
with the banks in the Steering Committee.61 
Then in 1978, when Peru was negotiating with 
the Steering Committee to refinance its com-
mercial debts, it was widely reported that one 
member of the Committee threatened to tie the 
success of the negotiations to satisfactory set-
tlement of a dispute it had with the government 
over the handling of the foreign exchange 
earnings of a local foreign firm to which the 
bank had extended a large loan.62 
Banks have also sought to influence the 
policies of governments that are not in an open 
debt crisis. For instance, a widely-circulated 
and highly-respected publication of one of the 
largest international banks in 1976 made the 
following comments about Brazil's manage-
ment of its economy: 
"In this regard, Brazil's delay in internal 
adjustment has come as a disappointment. 
There, the growth in aggregate demand, the 
reemergence of the fiscal deficit, and the 
acceleration of inflation (estimated at45%-50% 
for this year) have been inconsistent with the 
clear necessity for a current account ad-
justment".63 
It is no coincidence that the bank was a major 
creditor of Brazil, thus making the statement 
not unlike the medieval practice of admonish-
ing debtors in the main public square. This 
rather heavy-handed commentary is not some-
thing one would expect from a "remote and 
neutral" market. 
Another final consideration about the 
^ S e e Belliveau. 
6 1 SeeWel lons(1976) ,p .74 . 
6 2 See Latin American Economic Report, No. 20, May 
26,1978. I t is only fair to add that the bank later denied ever 
having established such a link. 
^Morgan Guaranty Trust Company (October 1976), 
p p . 3-4. 
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competit iveness of international banking is 
that while there are indeed hundreds of insti-
tutions dealing in the Eurocurrency market 
—generat ing conditions that some think ap-
proximate a perfectly competitive environ-
ment— access to credit is actually controlled by 
a relatively small coterie of banks. This is 
because only very large banks have the re-
sources and good will to be leaders or orga-
nizers of syndicates. It is these banks —which 
maybe number roughly 50 in all —that 
dominate the market. As leaders of credit 
operations it is they who evaluate a country's 
creditworthiness and pass on information to 
prospective lenders in the placement me-
morandum that accompanies each loan syn-
dication. Thus, the opinion of these banks can 
influence the attitude of the whole market 
towards a borrower. Moreover, it would appear 
that there is a considerable degree of concen-
tration among the leading banks themselves. 
For instance, table 2 shows that of the top 50 
lead managers of syndicated credits in 1977 
and 1978, the top 10 were responsible for 58% 
and 44%, respectively, of the total amount 
mobilized through such syndication.64 Thus, 
We have just seen some of the drawbacks that 
might be associated with having commercial 
banks at the forefront of the allocation of 
resources to developing countries. Unfortu-
nately, in economics it is easier to diagnose 
problems than to prescribe cures for them and 
this final section of the paper now has the 
difficult task of suggesting some alternatives. 
A. The international division of labour for 
development finance 
In general it appears that what is needed is 
some rethinking about the current division of 
^ I n 1975-1976 concentration among lead banks was 
much more severe. Greater dispersion in 1977-1978 was 
the result of a higher profile tor Japanese and German 
one could conclude that a handful of banks 
have a disproportionate amount of power in the 
distribution of international commercial bank 
credit, perhaps making for a less competitive 
environment than would at first sight seem to 
exist in view of the hundreds of banks dealing 
in the Eurocurrency market. 
Table 2 
PRIVATE COMMERCIAL BANKS: DISTRIBUTION 
O F SYNDICATES AMONG TOP 50 EUROCREDIT 
L E A D M A N A G E R S 
(Percentage of credits mobilized) 
1977 1978 
Value of Number of Value of Number of 
credits credits credits credits 
Top 
5 banks 38 33 25 30 
Top 
10 banks 58 44 44 50 
Top 
50 banks 100 100 100 100 
Source; Derived from data in Eurotnoney, February 1979. 
labour for development finance. There are 
many sources of finance, and each one is 
usually particularly good at performing certain 
tasks. 
Let us look first at commercial banks. They 
are especially good at financing trade. They 
have a world-wide network of branches and 
correspondents with which to follow trade 
flows, and decisions on finance can be made 
quickly because of their familiarity with their 
clients. Assessment of risk does not have to be 
terribly sophisticated, because much of the 
finance is self-liquidating and the duration of 
agreements is on the short side: this, inciden-
banks, coupled with the restrained activities of American 
banks. 
IV 
Exploring the alternatives 
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tally, is in keeping with both the limited risk-
assessing ability of most commercial banks and 
the short-term deposit base of these insti-
tutions. 
Banks are also exceptionally suited for 
financing highly profitable commercial ven-
tures with a quick return, say between 5 and 7 
years. Another area which appears suitable is 
the financing of working capital, i.e., the pure 
need for short-term liquidity. 
Just as banks are exceptionally suited for 
the above tasks, however, they are inferior at 
some others. One area where banks display 
severe limitations is in the provision of finance 
for ventures with a long payout. Social infra-
structure requires maturities far beyond the 
reach of banks, and not surprisingly, these 
institutions are sometimes chary about lending 
in this area. But many commercial ventures, 
too, may be out of the reach of banks, particular-
ly those that are very capital intensive. Some 
might argue that there are few commercial 
projects that cannot provide returns within the 
10-12 year maturities being offered by banks in 
1978-1979. However, this assumes that matu-
rities will never shrink again as they did in 
1974-1975. It also assumes that ventures will 
meet their cash flow projections: something 
that is far from certain for infant industries in 
developing countries. 
Moreover, banks cannot adequately fill 
liquidity needs when lack of liquidity is due to 
structural imbalances (real or financial) in the 
economy. Thus, if balance of payments or fiscal 
difficulties stem from something other than a 
temporary exogenous factor (e.g., a fall in the 
price of a major export commodity), banks are 
an inferior source of finance. In these circum-
stances —which are very common in devel-. 
oping countries— if banks extend "no ques-
tions asked" finance they become a permissive 
influence that masks the need for changes in 
structure and policy. Peru up to 1975 fell victim 
to an overly co-operative banking community. 
On the other hand, if banks attempt to induce 
changes in policy and structure they become 
interventionist. Because of their private- com-
mercial character, when they negotiate with 
sovereign governments they are open to 
charges of conflicts of interest and political 
subversion. To this must be added the fact that 
the maturities that they can offer under the risk 
associated with restructuring may simply be 
inadequate for the circumstances. Consequent-
ly, when banks embark upon the financing of 
structural balance-of-payments problems they 
enter into a "no win" situation. 
Accordingly, when the commercial banks 
initiated the recycling of the OPEC surplus few 
complained: banks recycled quickly, and most 
thought the crisis to be temporary, as a full 
recovery in the Centre was seen to be im-
minent and "market forces" would quickly put 
an end to the OPEC cartel. But, of course, so far 
this has not been the case, as balance-of-
payments disequilibria have gained a more 
permanent character and most developing 
countries (and developed countries as well) 
appear to be interested in restructuring (over 
and above the normal restructuring associated 
with development) to accomodate themselves 
to a new era of higher energy costs and slower 
growth in the Centre. It is most distressing, 
however, to find that no adequate finance is 
available to developing countries for such 
restructuring: Brazil, for example, has had no 
choice but to fund its massive import substi-
tution/restructuring programme on the limited 
and uncertain maturities of commercial banks. 
Which institutions, then, would appear to 
be the experts in those areas where commercial 
banks face constraints? The author believes 
that the answer is the multilateral agencies and 
private bond markets. 
Multilateral agencies —i.e., the World 
Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, 
etc. — display great virtues with regard to some 
of the special needs of developing countries. 
First, they possess highly trained profes-
sional staff who have a wealth of experience 
with the problems confronting developing 
countries. They can help in project prepara-
tion, troubleshoot where problems arise, and 
assist in follow-up evaluation. Moreover, they 
are interested in the success of the project and 
not just its finance and repayment, and further-
more they are capable of collaborating with 
authorities in the formulation of global policy 
for development without raising suspicions of 
conflicts of interest. 
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Second, and even more important, multi-
lateral agencies are not commercial institutions 
and therefore can accept time and risk situa-
tions compatible with the far-reaching needs of 
development . Thus, multilateral agencies can 
and do lend to countries which display liquidi-
ty and political conditions that would simply 
unnerve a private banker. Moreover, their 
special character enables these agencies to 
permit repayment periods of up to 25 years or 
more, which is the type of finance that can 
smoothly promote the broad-based socioeco-
nomic change integral to the process of devel-
opment . Implicit in this capability is a willing-
ness to finance projects of a basic needs 
character, and to encourage this type of devel-
opment as well. 
Third, unlike commercial banks where 
developing countries have no influence over 
policy, developing countries are voting mem-
bers of multilateral agencies and have an op-
portunity to influence events in them. Nor is 
this virtue negated by the fact that LDCs are a 
minority voting block. As long as industrialized 
countries contribute the bulk of the funds, the 
credibility of multilateral agencies is best 
maintained if those countries have technical 
control over decision-making. If the LDCs act 
together, however, they can form an effective 
lobby for pressuring the industrialized coun-
tries to adopt policies favourable to their needs. 
LDCs can also improve their voice in policy 
matters by ensuring that they gain maximum 
representation on the staffs of multilateral 
agencies by sponsoring candidates for their 
technical competence and not for their domes-
tic political connexions.65 
T h e above is not to suggest that multi-
lateral institutions are perfect. The quality of 
their finance undoubtedly can be improved. 
For instance, there could be greater articu-
lation between the IMF and World Bank so that 
standby programmes can, where appropriate, 
take on a long-term character and facilitate real 
structural —as opposed to just temporary mon-
etary/financial — change. In line with much 
longer standby agreements, conditionality 
could be moderated to take into greater account 
6 5 This point has been raised before by Jeker, p. 225. 
domestic political and social objectives and the 
need to avoid reductions of employment and 
per capita income in developing countries.66 
There is also a great need for significant 
programme lending by development institu-
tions like the World Bank and IDB.67 Many 
more examples of desirable changes could be 
given. Fortunately, unlike commercial banks, 
whose actions are constrained by the commer-
cial interests of their stockholders and the rules 
of prudent banking, the policy frontiers of mul-
tilateral institutions are only limited by the 
courage and imagination of policy-makers in 
the industrialized countries. 
As for private bond markets, they afford 
developing countries the opportunity to ac-
quire funds for considerably longer terms than 
those usually oifered by commercial banks. 
Also, their interest rates are generally fixed 
through the life of the maturities, providing 
LDCs with a predictable cost that can easily be 
incorporated into planning strategies. Another 
consideration is that bond markets are really 
standoffish and remote in the sense that borro-
wer and lender never meet each other. Their 
major drawback is that investors tend to be 
rather unpredictable and therefore access may 
be somewhat unreliable. 
There are two other important specialists 
in the international financial arena that are 
worthy of mention; commercial suppliers and 
bilateral government agencies. Both are usual-
ly associated with "vested interest" finance, 
i.e., finance which is itself only a means to a 
broader objective. The conditions of finance 
can prove to be very attractive, and although 
this may be offset by their being tied to 
particular goods or political positions, the 
interests of the borrower may nevertheless 
sometimes overlap with those of the lender, 
making for a mutually beneficial transaction. It 
is in these circumstances that suppliers and 
government can play an important role in the 
division of labour for development finance. 
For an excellent comprehensive critique of IMF 
standby programmes and suggestions for reform see United 
Nations, 1979. 
67Non-project lending is essential if the World Bank 
and IDB are to take on a larger role in stabilization efforts 
that involve structural changes in an economy. 
COMMERCIAL BANK FINANCE FROM THE NORTH / Robert Devlin 85 
B. Can this division of labour 
be made to work? 
We have just outlined what may be considered 
a reasonable division of labour for devel-
opment finance based on an existing infra-
structure. Unfortunately, some actors in the 
global division of labour have had their activi-
ties restricted for one reason or another, cre-
ating a vacuum that has been filled in an ad hoc 
fashion by comercial banks, which in contrast 
have been able to expand almost without limits 
because of surging world liquidity and an 
unregulated Eurocurrency market. The prob-
lem, as we have seen, is that banks cannot 
properly assume their new role and it is 
necessary to find some way of rectifying this 
imbalance in the sources of finance. 
Multilateral agencies have suffered from a 
lack of an automatic funding mechanism, 
wariness on the part of donors, and a general 
ideological shift away from multilateralism. In 
an age of fiscal deficits and tax revolts new 
contributions to development institutions have 
become unfashionable: indeed, perhaps one 
reason for the industrialized countries' com-
placency about the role of their banks in 
development finance is that it is simply less of a 
fiscal burden to have private commercial banks 
channelling resources to developing coun-
tries.68 
What is needed to counter this trend is a 
campaign to alert public opinion to the need for 
massive resource transfers on more reasonable 
terms to developing countries. This can be 
viewed as simply enlightened self-interest, for 
while commercial bank financing appears on 
the surface to be working smoothly, the inferior 
quality of the finance, coupled with other well-
known maladies of the international economy, 
may be generating underlying social and eco-
nomic tensions that could make the world of 
the 1980s a much less pleasant place to live in. 
Moreover, transfers to the South usually come 
back to the North in the form of purchases of 
goods for import, thus creating new business 
and jobs for the industrialized nations. 
^ T o the extent that commercial bank profits are taxed 
by the industrialized countries, the shift to bank finance of 
development could even be profitable for the governments 
of the industrialized countries, 
There has been no lack of proposals for 
transfers. The annex to this paper reproduces 
an excellent summary bf current proposals 
prepared by the Overseas Development 
Council. They are all characterized by sophis-
ticated mechanisms to provide long-term fi-
nance to developing countries. Multilateral 
agencies are seen in the role of managers of 
funds. The mayor obstacle to the proposed 
programmes seems to be the generation of 
resources. It may therefore be worthwhile to 
briefly review some tentative ideas on how 
resources could be generated, concentrating on 
the need for automatic funding. 
One possibility is to assign to the World 
Bank and IMF a more direct role in transferring 
savings from North to South. Many have 
complained about the lack of symmetry in 
pressures on countries to adjust their balance of 
payments;69 deficit countries must submit to 
vigorous IMF programmes, while surplus 
countries suffer at worst moral suasion. Why 
not arrange for surplus countries in the indus-
trialized world and OPEC to place 50% of their 
annual surplus (after adjustment for coverage of 
"normal" capital outflows) on deposit with the 
aforementioned institution? Something near a 
commercial interest rate could be paid, as in 
the Fund's Supplementary Oil Facility. Alter-
natively, ifdesired, a tax could be placed on the 
surplus by offering much less than a commer-
cial rate. Withdrawals would not be permitted 
until a surplus country's "non-deposited" 
surplus fell to some critical level —say the 
equivalent of 3 months' imports— and even 
then withdrawals would still be in line with the 
trends in the country's balance of payments. 
Since surpluses tend to accumulate in the 
industrialized countries and OPEC, the fund 
would be continuously renewed. The special 
character of developing institutions would 
allow them to mismatch maturities and transfer 
these resources to the South on appropriate 
terms. Admittedly, unless the surplus is heavi-
ly taxed this proposal would place only mild 
additional pressure on surplus countries, since 
access to surplus receipts is maintained: its 
chief value, therefore, is that it would allow 
69For a critique of the lack of symmetry in adjustment 
pressure, see United Nations, pp. III.8-III.13. 
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more resources to be channelled through de-
velopment agencies. 
Ways also need to be explored on how to 
achieve permanent increases in the capital 
base of international agencies which will facil-
itate their ability to capture funds on inter-
national capital markets. One measure might 
be to channel SDR allocations to subscriptions 
of capital in these institutions. Inviting the 
centrally planned economies to participate in 
the development effort by joining develop-
men t institutions would also increase capital 
and have the added benefit of providing great-
er ideological plurality in these agencies. The 
industrialized countries and OPEC, for their 
part, could consider directly guaranteeing 
bond issues of multilateral agencies, thereby 
facilitating greater leverage over the existing 
capital base. 
Less certain are the possibilities of raising 
capital contributions via taxes in developed 
countries. The constraints are more political 
than real, however, as ample room exists for 
new revenue. Emergency economic devel-
opment taxes on luxury consumption, i.e., 
cigarettes, liquor, oversized cars, second 
homes , luxury restaurants, etc., could pain-
lessly produce considerable annual contribu-
tions. T h e problem in this approach is that 
small interest groups may be able to resist the 
introduction of what otherwise are rational 
measures. 
Another scheme that enjoys some support 
is co-financing between multilateral banks and 
Third World finance institutions. In this way 
banks would come under the umbrella of mul-
tilateralism and effectively expand the re-
sources being channelled through develop-
ment agencies. Banks participating in co-fi-
nancing would presumably offer slightly lower 
interest rates and somewhat longer maturities. 
T h e value of the scheme is that it requires no 
real change in the existing financial system. 
The disadvantage is that it could be construed 
as a substitute for increasing the capital base of 
multilateral agencies. It could also further 
erode the degree of plurality in sources of 
finance and "cartelize" development finance. 
In exploring the resource problem, it 
might also be useful to question the current 
practice of charging all developing countries 
the same rate of interest on regular (i.e., non-
IDA) loans from development institutions. In 
order to stretch development funds to the 
greatest degree possible, one might consider 
varying interest rates to suit the level of 
development of the borrower country. Lower-
income countries could continue to receive 
absolutely concessionary rates, whereas upper-
income countries, which are not so much 
interested in aid as in rather longer maturities, 
could be charged commercial rates of interest. 
Furthermore, rates to upper-income countries 
could continue to be fixed in principle, but 
with provision for the periodic adjustment of 
old loans should they become uncommercial 
over the medium term. Even with commercial 
rates there could be some cost savings on loans: 
with greater access to multilateral finance there 
might be less need to maintain large amounts of 
borrowed international reserves, many of the 
fees and ancillary charges of loan syndication 
would be eliminated, and prepayment could be 
effected without penalty. 
Turning to international bond markets, 
these have not been a dynamic source of funds 
for developing countries since the great finan-
cial collapse of the 1930s. The industrialized 
countries have placed great administrative 
barriers in the way of LDC bond issues, 
creating a two-tier system whereby rich coun-
tries tap Eurobonds and poor countries Euro-
credits. This is regrettable, because bond 
markets can be a very suitable way to finance 
development, and while they cannot take the 
place of dynamic multilateral development 
finance, they certainly can take some pressure 
off development and institutions. Undoubted-
ly, rich countries should reconsider their poli-
cies in this area. 
As for bilateral finance, this has no doubt 
slipped because of aid weariness and it might 
be difficult to stimulate this source again, 
although it might be possible to secure re-
consideration of schemes which are actually 
designed to restrict funding, such as the Gen-
t lemen's Agreement among O E C D export 
credit agencies, at least as far as finance for 
LDCs is concerned. 
After reviewing proposals for North-South 
transfers of resources and some possibilities 
for financing them, one cannot help but think 
that current problems are of a political rather 
than an economic nature. There are a multitude 
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of technical ways to enhance the functioning of willpower and courage it would be possible to 
the international division of labour in the field improve upon the present transfer mechanism, 
of development finance. The problem is to which has evolved in an ad hoc fashion and is 
develop the political will to implement them, less than adequate for the promotion of broad-
Many may feel that any massive reordering at based socioeconomic development. Hard-core 
this time runs counter to political realities and realists who may be skeptical of change should 
it is therefore best to accept the present system, perhaps ponder on the fact that those who are 
with perhaps some minor modifications, excessively realistic can be the most unrealistic 
However , one should remember that reality of all. 
can be modified to some degree, and with due 
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F u n d s 
Senator Javits' Proposal: Growth 
Development Fund. 
US) 25 billion 
(US$ 5 billion per year) 
5-year initial period 
To establish a capital fund for 
productive investments in the 
LDCs that will promote rational 
agricultural and industrial devel-
opment and trade leading to the 
expansion of markets and the 
stimulation of the world economy. 
1. Economic growth is stagnating 
in many countries, necessi-
tating a rise in capital stock to 
increase productivity. 
2. OPEC recycling is inadequate 
because it fails to generate 
macro-economic policies in ¿M-
importing nations needed to 
restore purchasing power. 
3 . T h e foreign exchange drain 
resulting from oil imports is 
constraining the purchasing 
power of oil-importing LDCs, 
Industrial and OPEC countries. 
Fund could be designed and 
implemented by the World Bank, 
regional development banks, and 
the IMF, or a new institution could 
be created. 
Mexican Proposal: Long-term 
Recycling Facility (IMF/IBKD 
Development Committee). 
USÎ 15 billion 
Long term 
To increase the supply of long-
term iunds to the LDCs for 
financing capital goods purchases. 
1. Low long-term growth rates 
in DCs are slowing world trade, 
fostering protectionism, acid 
leading to .sluggish demand for 
capital goods of DCs. 
2. LDCs have potential demand 
for capital goods not made 
effective for lack of financing. 
3. The high level of financing by 
die international banking sys-
tem cannot be sustained in the 
future. 
4. There are short- and medium-
term recycling facilities for 
balance-of-paymenls adjus-
ments but none tor the longer 
term. 
Public and private investors of 
countries with strong balance-of-
payments and financial positions 
(including institutional investors). 
New lending operation at the 
World Bank. 
Venenuelan Proposal: Joint 
OPEC/OECD Global Stimulation 
Plan (Ronald Miiller). 
Not specified, but in range of US$ 
20-40 billion. 
5-10 years, commencing before 
1980. 
To mobilize unused savings in 
OPEC and the OECD into a capi-
tal pool and to invest diese funds 
in the non-oil-LDCs in such a way 
as to increase their purchases of 
exports from the industrial nations; 
to head-off medium-term inter-
national supply shortages; and to 
implement structural adjustment 
plans in the O E C D . 
1. With simultaneous unemploy-
ment and inflation together 
with declining profitability and 
productivity in D C industries, 
O E C D capital formation is 
lagging and there is a trend to-
wards long-term stagnation. 
2. OPEC recycling could be 
longer-term. 
3. There are serious policy lags in 
DCs and LDCs regarding ma-
cro-economic management and 
international economic co-
ordination. 
4. The Third World could be a 
new source of sustained de-
mand —a new growth frontier— 
for the world economy. 
5. There is a need to alleviate the 
poverty and debt problems of 
the LDCs. 
1. Underutilized savings in OPEC 
and OECD; 20-25% from 
OPEC's accumulated petro-
dollar earnings, and the rest 
from private investors. 
2. Contributions from O E C D 
nations to World Bank (addi-
tional or reallocation). 
Special window at World Bank and 
IFC, and/or regional institutions. 
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tion of Funds 
O E C D Investment Plan 
US$ 5-10 billiun in additional 
capital flows. 
3-5 years of increased transfers, 
within a medium-term timeframe 
of up to 8 years. 
To undertake a major increase in 
investment flows to LDCs as a 
general stimulus to world econo-
mic activity directed at structural 
change over the medium temi in 
key supply sectors. 
1. The recovery of the OECD 
economies from the recession is 
not yet self-sustaining and a 
stimulus is needed for eco-
nomic activity. 
2. There is currently substantial 
underutilization of resources in 
the O E C D and a widespread 
feeling of uncertainty deters in-
vestment. 
3. Current patterns of investment 
in key supply sectors are in-
adequate for thtí long-term 
needs of both DCs and LDCs. 
Equity and debt from private 
and commercial sources in OPEC 
and O E C D (not ODA because po-
litically unrealistic). 
Co-financing arrangements through 
the World Bank family. 
Trilateral Food Task Force 
Programme Doubling Rice 
Production in S/SE Asia (Hayami/ 
Takase). 
Total capital cost of U S | 52.6 bi-
llkm(1975 constant USt) but only 
USI 1.8 billion annually in ad-
ditional flows. 
15 year period; 1978-1993. 
To double rice production in Asia 
through irrigation improvements. 
1. Focusing entirely on the world 
food problem, Asia is chosen 
because two-third s of the 
world's malnourished live 
there , and Asia has great poten-
tial for a quantitative increase 
in food production. 
2. Improvement and expansion of 
irrigation, which requires capi-
tal, is critical to increasing food 
production in Asia. 
1. Multilateral or bilateral foreign 
agricultural aid, including 
O P E C assistance, 
2. Asian developing countries' 
irrigation budgets. 
3. US$ 1.8 billion per year in 
additional capital contributions 
(presumably ODA) by DC and 
OPEC countries. 
Donor countries and agencies 
would direct funds to agricultural 
sector in Asian LDCs. 
Roger Hansen 's Proposal: 
A Clobal Basic Human Needs 
Régime 
US$ 12 billion (constant US | ) per 
annum which would cover all in-
vestment costs and half of the 
annual maintenance costs. 
20 year period. 
To establish a global basic human 
needs régime with a view to eli-
minating absolute poverty in two 
decades. 
1. The poverty problem is not 
insurmountable, but without 
a focused attack its dimen-
sion» are likely to grow along 
with population problems. 
2. There is a need for a less inter-
ventionist channel for ODA - a 
highly qualified, specialized 
basic needs agency. 
3. Incremental increases in ODA 
tlirougi] existing channels are 
unlikely to have a major impact 
on poverty because ODA is cur-
rently determined largely by 
other objectives, concerns and 
political pressures. 
1. ODA from DAC countries pled-
ged on amult iyèar basis. O E C D 
countries should put most of 
their ODA into basic needs 
programmes and raise their 
ODA levels to 0.45-0.50% of 
C N P by the early 1980s. 
2. ODA from OPEC as well as 
other better-off LDCs. 
Preferably through North-South 
action, a neutral international 
agency would be created, to re-
ceive financial contributions, 
make allucative decisions and 
monitor performance. The UN sys-
tem.including the World Bank and 
regional development banks, 
could also be involved. 
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Senator Javits' Proposal: 
Growth Development Fund 
1. Funds would be divided into 
two parts; half (US* 2.5 billion) 
would go to the poorest LDCs, 
and the other half on a loan 
basis to the more creditworthy 
advanced developing countries. 
2. Terms could be negotiated to 
meet the concerns of donor 
countries regarding the sus-
tained value of their funds 
invested in the Fund and the 
need for liquid assets in the 
event of economic emer-
gencies, 
3. The fund could give priority 
to energy investments. 
1. Projectsthatexpanddemandfor 
OECD goods. 
2. Energy exploration and alter-
native energy source projects. 
3. I DA-related projects in poorest 
LDCs. 
1. More "creditworthy" advanced 
developing countries. 
2, Poorest LDCs. 
1. Would stimulate economic 
growth in the LDCs. 
2. Would expand demand for ex-
ports of the OECD, leading to 
higher levels of employment 
and domestic economic activi-






1. Total capital subscription of 
the facility could be divided 
into three borrowing operation s 
of US$5 billion each. 
2.Debt instruments denominated 
in SDRs would be issued to 
lenders for a 15-year term 
with a market rate of 
interest. 
3. Secondary market would be 
developed to give liquidity 
to these instruments. 
4. Governments not contributing 
direct loans could guarantee 
loans granted by the facility, 
5. Purchases of DC capital goods 
financed by the facility would 
be limited to countries granting 
loans or guarantees. 
6. Capital goods would be pur-
chased in connexion with spe-
cific projects approved in 
LDCs by the World Bank. 
Loans could be extended to 
national private firms operating 
in LDCs. 
Projects that require long-term 
capital purchases from OECD 
countries, 
(Middle-incomeLDCs). 
1. Would contribute to the sti-
mulation of capital goods sec-
tors in DCs that suiter from 
inadequate demand, and would 
also facilitate structural adjust-
ments in DCs. 
2, Would provide necessary long-
term resources for LDCs to fi-
nance their demand for capital 
goods. 
3, Would provide an additional 
investment outlet for surplus 
countries. 
4. Would help develop a better 
structure of assets and liabilities 
in the financial system. 
Venezuelan Proposal: 
Joint OPEC/0ECD Global 
Stimulation Plan 
(Ronald Mui 1er) 
1. OPEC money would be raised 
through the issue of "OPEC 
Development Bonds" in inter-
national capital markets. OPEC 
would purchase 20-25% of the 
total subscription of long-term 
Triple A bonds (12-20 year 
maturities). 
2. The remainder would be sold 
to private investors in capital 
markets. 
3. OPEC would act as first 
guarantor, with the World 
Bank family as the second. 
4. Funds would be targeted to 
purchases in OECD sectors 
operating at low capacity utili-
zation level s i in the medium 
term funds would be targeted to 
international sectors where 
supply shortages are likely. 
5. In the third year, intensified 
domestic structural adjustment 
efforts would commence. 
6. About 20-25% of the funds 
would go to poorest LDCs. 
1. Basic needs projects in the 
poorest LDCs (20-25% of 
funds). 
2. Projects that generate a rate of 
return equivalent to that of AAA 
Bonds. 
3. Targeting in the short term of 
OECD industries operating at 
low capacity utilization. 
4. Targeting in the medium term 
on supply sectors where there 
could be shortages. 
(All LDCs). 
1. Would increase OECD-wide 
capital formation. 
2. Would expand demand for 
goods from OECD industrial 
sectors with excess capacity. 
3. Would have positive employ-
ment impacts and be less infla-
tionary than current OECD 
domestic demand stimulation, 
because it would absorb liquid 
or near-liquid assets, and would 
be targeted to OECD industrial 
sectors operating at low capaci-
ty utilization levels. 
4. Would alleviate the need for 
immediate structural adjust-
ment in many DCs. 
5. Would help LDCs' debt and 
poverty problems. 
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OECD Investment Plan 
1. The programme would rely on 
co-financing through the World 
Bank family. 
2. Funds would not be tied to 
specific industries in DCs but 
would be directed in the me-
dium term to sectors where 
supply problems will become 
critical: food, energy, commo-
dities, and related infrastruc-
ture. 
Projects related to food, commodi-
ties, energy and related infra-
structure. 
(All developing countries). 
1. Would stimulate demand and 
increase production in both 
LDCs and DCs. 
Trilateral Food Task Force Pro-
gramme Doubling Rice 
Production in S/SE Asia (Hayami/ 
Takase). 
1. Resources would be invested in 
irrigation and related needs, in-
cluding research, modem farm 
inputs, and marketing systems. 
.2. Target for 1993 would be to 
double rice production from the 
1974 level of 136 million tons to 
321 million tons for a popula-
tion of 1.72 billion by convert-
ing 17.5 million hectares of ina-
dequately irrigated areas and 
30.4 million hectares of rained 
areas to adequately irrigated 
areas. 
Rice production. 
Countries in South and Southeast 
Asia. 
1. Would improve the supply-
demand balance for food and 
have Income-creating effects 
which would enhance the 
purchasing power of peasants. 
Roger Hansen's Proposal: A Glo-
bal Basic Human Needs Régime. 
1. The programme would require 
long-term high levels of North-
em funding. 
2. The programme would require 
LDC willingness to commit 
funds to an altered develop-
ment strategy. 
3. Funds would be allocated by an 
international agency on the 
basis of an LDC's programme 
performance and yearly budge-
tary needs. 
4. The agency would monitor pro-
gramme performance to assure 
that funds are being used in 
accordance with negotiated 
programme guidelines. 
Basic needs development projects 
in LDCs. 
(Developing countries committed 
to basic needs programmes), 
Could susbtantially reduce or eli-
minate absolute poverty for the 
one billion people who now exist 
in this state. 
Source: Overseas Development Council, Washington, D.C., 1978. 
